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orporate governance is generally considered to be the set
 of complementary mechanisms that help align the actions 
and choices of managers with the interests of shareholders. 
Monitoring actions by the board of directors, debtholders, or 
institutional blockholders can have an important impact on the 
economic performance of an organization (for example, Jensen 
[1989], Mehran [1995], Core, Holthausen, and Larcker [1999], 
and Holderness [2003]). Another important and often debated 
component of the governance structure is the compensation 
contract selected for providing remuneration to managers (for 
example, the level of remuneration or choice of performance 
measures).
Executive compensation has been the subject of extensive 
prior research, and excellent general reviews already exist for 
the interested reader (for example, Murphy [1999]). For our 
purposes here, we will not reproduce this discussion but rather 
focus on the more narrow, but crucial, topic of stock-based 
compensation and incentives.
Stock and option compensation and the level of managerial 
equity incentives are aspects of corporate governance that are 
especially controversial to shareholders, institutional activists, 
and governmental regulators. Similar to much of the corporate 
finance and corporate governance literature, research on stock-
based compensation and incentives has generated not only 
useful insights, but also has produced many contradictory 
findings. Not surprisingly, many fundamental questions 
remain unanswered, and one of our goals is to highlight topics 
that seem especially appropriate for future research.
Within the corporate governance literature, and more 
specifically within the executive compensation literature, there 
are alternative views on the efficiency of observed contracting 
arrangements between firms and their executives. For the 
purposes of this survey and as an organizing principle of our 
literature review, we follow a traditional agency-theory 
framework and define an efficient contract as one that 
maximizes the net expected economic value to shareholders 
after transaction costs (such as contracting costs) and 
payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying this is that 
we assume that contracts minimize agency costs. Clearly, the 
types of contracts that are efficient at any particular time or in 
a particular sector of the economy are a function of various 
transaction costs. For instance, a contract that was efficient in 
the United States fifty years ago may not be efficient today 
because information costs have fallen greatly and the optimal 
organizational form has changed as a result. Over time, optimal 
contracting arrangements evolve with changes in contracting 
technology. As part of this evolutionary process, firms are 
experimenting with new contracting technologies. Some 
experiments succeed and others fail as firms update their beliefs 
and learn about the efficiency of their governance structures. 
Throughout this process, firms may be uncertain about the 
optimal contracting technology. As a result of this uncertainty 
and because of differences in beliefs about optimal incentive 
levels, one would expect variation in the observed contracts 
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across firms. However, unless beliefs are systematically biased, 
we expect that compensation contracts are efficient, on 
average, and that average equity incentive levels across firms 
are neither “too high” nor “too low.” (For an example and 
discussion of how an evolutionary process converges to an 
efficient outcome, see Lazear [1995, pp. 8-10].)
In contrast to this economic perspective, a number of 
scholars and practitioners either implicitly or explicitly take the 
view that contracting arrangements are largely inefficient and 
do not minimize agency costs (for example, Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny [1988], Crystal [1991], and Jensen [1993]). A view 
that sees most firms behaving inefficiently is hard to support. 
At the opposite extreme is the view that transaction costs in the 
labor market, the stock market, and the market for corporate 
control are so small that all agency costs are eliminated. Fama 
(1980), for instance, argues that labor market discipline 
eliminates agency problems with CEOs, who know that any 
opportunistic behavior will be punished by a complete down-
ward revision of the value of their human capital. However, this 
view abstracts away from information costs, contracting costs, 
and frictions in the market for corporate control.
Later research (for example, Shleifer and Vishny [1997] and 
Zingales [1998]) develops theories that incorporate the 
attractive features of both of these polar extremes. This 
approach assumes that firms contract optimally, but that 
transaction costs prohibit continuous recontracting. Since 
contracting is not continuous, firms’ contracts gradually 
deviate from the optimal level. This view allows some managers 
to exploit shareholders because the managers have temporarily 
gained power, but this process is mean-reverting so that 
shareholders, over time, regain authority (Zingales 1998). 
Thus, at any point in time, the existence of recontracting costs 
allows some managers and firms to extract rents, but on 
average the system is efficient within transaction costs. Notice 
that this perspective does not imply that it is impossible to find 
examples of gross agency problems; it only suggests that these 
observations are “unusual” in cross section and are likely to be 
reduced over time. This definition of efficiency is used in our 
discussion.
We also concentrate our survey on literature that tests 
economic hypotheses within samples of U.S. firms. However, 
we believe that much of our discussion can be generalized to 
firms throughout the world. Bushman and Smith (2003) 
present a broad overview of how differences in country-specific 
factors lead to different governance and compensation 
structures that arise endogenously within those environments. 
In many other countries, investors are not as well-protected 
and widely dispersed ownership is not optimal. In these 
settings, managers and their families retain much ownership 
and explicit equity-based compensation may be unnecessary 
(La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999). Important 
features of the U.S. environment include a regulatory system 
that emphasizes the protection of shareholders and requires 
that each firm transparently disclose material information 
about its finances and its contracts, and a government that 
grants individuals and firms much freedom to seek their own 
good. These features contribute to widely dispersed ownership 
in many U.S. firms, in which managers own a small fraction of 
the equity, and where the relatively low managerial ownership 
levels make it potentially important to write contracts that 
emphasize equity ownership. As a working theoretical 
representation, we assume that the use of equity compensation 
in the United States is endogenously determined within the 
broad legal, regulatory, and governance environment faced by 
U.S. firms.
Our objective is to synthesize the broad literature on equity 
compensation and executive incentives. Moreover, we hope to 
reduce some of the unsupported rhetoric or folklore in the 
academic literature and practitioner discussions on equity-
based compensation. There remain many unanswered 
questions and considerable controversy within some areas of 
the research with respect to theoretical assumptions and 
empirical approaches to testing these theories. We do not 
attempt to resolve all of these controversies, but instead we try 
to highlight areas in which research could shed light on these 
issues. Finally, we do not claim to provide an exhaustive review 
of this literature, and we admit that our views and interests 
influence our emphasis and inference.1
In the next section, we provide some basic institutional detail 
on the use of stock compensation and incentives. Section 3 
summarizes research on the determinants of equity incentives 
and the economic effects of these choices. Section 4 details 
unresolved issues, controversies, and topics for future research. 
Section 5 provides a brief summary of our review.
2. Institutional Background
Equity incentives and stock-based compensation are important 
features of the contracting environment between shareholders 
(as represented by the board of directors) and executives. Hall 
and Liebman (1998) and Hall and Murphy (forthcoming) 
provide evidence from samples of large U.S. firms that the 
overall sensitivity of CEO stock-based wealth to changes in 
stock price and the vast majority of this sensitivity come 
from CEO stock and option ownership. Hall and Murphy 
(forthcoming) report that in 1998, the median values of 
stock and options held by Standard & Poor’s industrial 
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$30 million and $55 million, respectively. These values and 
sensitivities are large relative to annual flow pay. For example, 
Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2000) report that the ratio of 
equity portfolio value to annual total pay was 30.3 on average 
for CEOs during the 1993-98 period.
There has been a large increase in the use of stock options 
to provide CEO compensation and incentives. In 1980, CEO 
annual flow compensation was mainly in the form of cash 
salary and bonus (Hall and Liebman 1998), with only
30 percent of CEOs receiving new option grants. Mean 
salary and bonus was $655,000, compared with $155,000 from 
new option grants. By 1994, options had become a major 
component of CEO flow compensation, with 70 percent of 
CEOs receiving new option grants, and mean option grants 
amounting to $1.2 million (valued by the Black and Scholes 
[1973] model), compared with $1.3 million in cash pay. In 
addition to being an important component of chief executive 
compensation, stock options are an important component of 
CEO equity incentives. Hall and Liebman (1998) report that in 
1980, 57 percent of CEOs held some amount of options, and by 
1994, this figure had reached nearly 90 percent. In Core and 
Guay’s (1999) sample of CEOs from the 1992-96 period, 
options contributed approximately one-third to the value of 
the median CEO’s equity portfolio and contributed roughly 
one-half of the median CEO’s total equity incentives (that is, 
the sensitivity of portfolio value to stock price).
The use of options is pervasive but does vary across 
industries. Core and Guay (2001a) document cross-
sectional variation in the magnitude of corporate option 
plans. They find that the median large firm has options 
outstanding that amount to 5.5 percent of common shares 
outstanding. This percentage is relatively larger, 10 percent to 
14 percent, for growth industries such as computer, software, 
and pharmaceutical firms, and relatively smaller, 2 percent to 
3 percent, for low-growth industries such as utilities and 
petroleum firms. The fraction of total outstanding employee 
options held by top executives also varies by industry. Murphy 
(1999) shows that the importance of options in CEO annual 
pay is pervasive across several industry groups, but is 
substantially less important for utility firms. Consistent with 
these findings, Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2001) find that 
the use of stock options and restricted stock in high-
technology, “new-economy” firms substantially exceeds the 
equity compensation in large, “old-economy” manufacturing 
firms.
Another way to examine the importance of equity incentives 
is to examine stock option “overhang,” a measure commonly 
used by institutional investors. Option overhang is calculated 
as the ratio of stock options granted, plus options that have 
been approved for future grants, divided by the total shares 
outstanding. In our opinion, this measure is somewhat naive 
because it counts an unissued option the same as an issued 
option. Nevertheless, analysts and other institutional 
investors seem to use stock option overhang when analyzing 
firms’ investment potential. Using Investor Responsibility 
Research Center data on stock option overhang, we see that 
the mean (median) overhang was approximately 13.0 percent 
(11.2 percent) in 1999. Boards of directors have substantially 
increased overhang during the 1990s, and at the end of 2000 
they had approved options that amount to approximately 
10 percent of shares outstanding.
3. Equity Compensation
and Incentives
3.1 Compensation and Incentives
As noted in Antle and Smith (1986) and Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), executives are given variable compensation and 
incentives through three primary mechanisms: 1) flow 
compensation, which is the total of the CEO’s annual salary, 
bonus, new equity grants, and other compensation; 2) changes 
in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of stock and options; and 
3) the possibility that the market’s assessment of the CEO’s 
human capital will decrease following termination because 
of poor performance or a change in control. For executives 
below the CEO, the potential for promotion is an additional 
source of incentives.
In this paper, we define incentives as variation in executive 
wealth related to the stock price, and we focus on the incentives 
to increase the stock price provided by the manager’s owner-
ship of equity (such as stock and stock options). Consistent 
with the majority of research that examines the incentives 
provided by equity holdings, we use the term “equity 
incentives” to denote the incentives created by equity securities 
that motivate a manager to increase stock price.
We acknowledge that managerial equity holdings provide 
other incentives, but we do not devote much attention to these 
incentives, which we consider second-order effects and/or 
effects offset by other contracting mechanisms. (For example, 
although options provide incentives to cut dividends, it is easy 
for the board to require the CEO to maintain a certain 
dividend.) These other incentives arise because the value of 
stock and options is also sensitive to other moments of the 
stock price, such as variance (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
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Larcker, and Verrecchia 1991). For example, the value of 
common stock in a leveraged firm increases with the volatility 
of firm value, and the value of a stock option held by a 
diversified investor increases with the variance of stock price. 
Guay (1999) shows that the sensitivity of option portfolio value 
to stock return volatility can be economically significant for 
some CEOs, but the sensitivity of common stock value to 
volatility is economically unimportant for all but the most 
financially distressed firms (in Section 3.5, we discuss research 
that suggests that firms use options to provide risk-taking 
incentives to managers). Finally, the fact that the value of stock 
options decreases with the level of dividend payments suggests 
that option holders can have incentives to reduce dividend 
payments. A body of evidence documents lower dividend 
payments following the initiation of option plans (Lambert, 
Lanen, and Larcker 1989; Bartov, Krinsky, and Lee 1998) and 
suggests that managerial option holdings are associated with a 
substitution of repurchases for dividends (Fenn and Liang 2001).
Although we concentrate on the role of stock and stock 
options in providing incentives to increase stock price, stock 
options and restricted stock are also used as a means of 
attracting certain types of employees and increasing retention 
(or reducing voluntary turnover), and we discuss such use in 
Section 3.6. These uses of options are likely to be more 
important for lower level employees (Core and Guay 2001a; 
Oyer and Schaefer 2001). Survey data reported in Ittner et al. 
(2001) indicate that employee retention is a primary reason 
why firms use options. A useful area for future research is to 
examine the extent to which stock option programs actually 
affect voluntary turnover. Furthermore, as we discuss in 
Section 4.5, it is unclear if stock option plans are the most 
effective means of reducing turnover. Oyer and Schaefer 
provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that firms use 
option programs to attract employees who are less risk-averse 
and who have optimistic beliefs about the firm’s prospects.
In defining incentives as the sensitivity of the manager’s 
wealth to stock price changes, we ignore as well the incentives 
provided by the termination threat and from variation in the 
flow of annual compensation. We ignore as well variation in 
incentives from performance measures other than the stock 
price. For most CEOs, the assumption that the majority of 
incentives are driven by variation in the value of equity 
holdings is realistic.2 Murphy (1985), Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), and Hall and Liebman (1998) show that the vast 
majority of a typical CEO’s incentives to increase stock price 
are driven by variation in the value of his stock and option 
portfolio, that is, not by flow compensation. Core, Guay, and 
Verrecchia (2000) show that for the typical CEO, nonprice 
incentives provided by flow compensation are not 
economically large in comparison with the price-based 
incentives provided by the CEO’s equity portfolio.3
As one moves deeper into the organization to employees 
below the CEO and below top management, equity-based 
incentives take on a relatively less important role. For example, 
Core and Larcker (2001) find that non-CEO executives 
typically hold much less equity as a multiple of their base salary 
than does the CEO. For lower level managers, the stock price is 
less informative about actions, and local measures of 
performance (such as division profits) are more relevant and 
useful for providing incentives (Bushman, Indjejikian, and 
Smith 1995; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan 1997). In addition, the 
incentives related to potential promotion become more 
important. However, in cross section, firms vary substantially 
in their use of equity incentives for lower level employees. For 
example, lower level employees in high-technology firms tend 
to receive larger equity grants (Ittner et al. 2001) and hold 
greater levels of stock options (Core and Guay 2001a).
A substantial body of theoretical and empirical work 
supports stock price as a relevant performance measure for 
assessing executive choices. However, like any performance 
measure, stock price is a noisy measure of the executive’s 
performance because it is influenced by factors beyond the 
executive’s control. As a result, equity incentives impose risk on 
the executive and the executive must be paid a premium over 
an acceptable level of fixed cash pay to compensate for this risk. 
Clearly, there are costs to the firm for providing “too many” or 
“too few” equity incentives. For example, the executive may 
not take actions that maximize shareholder wealth—a possible 
outcome when “too many” or “too few” incentives are 
provided—or will require a large risk premium—a possible 
outcome when “too many” incentives are provided. We return 
to this topic later when we discuss relative performance 
evaluation and option valuation.
3.2 Measurement of Equity Incentives
A fundamental question for the compensation literature is the 
measurement of incentives in general, and equity incentives in 
particular. A key point in analyzing executive incentives is that 
an executive’s incentives from stock and options are properly 
measured by portfolio incentives (for example, Jensen and 
Murphy [1990] and Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia [1991]). 
As emphasized by Yermack (1995), one cannot determine 
whether an executive has an appropriate level of incentives by 
examining newly granted restricted stock and options compen-
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indicates that the correlation between newly granted incentives 
and previously held portfolio incentives is low.
Techniques for creating empirical proxies for equity 
incentives were originated by Jensen and Murphy (1990). 
These techniques are expensive, however, because complete 
data on the characteristics of an executive’s option holdings are 
not publicly available. Core and Guay (forthcoming a) develop 
and validate an inexpensive and accurate method of estimating 
option portfolio value and the sensitivities of option portfolio 
value to stock price and stock-return volatility that is easily 
implemented using data from only the current year’s proxy 
statement or annual report. This method can be applied to 
either executive stock-option portfolios or to firmwide option 
plans. In broad samples of actual and simulated CEO option 
portfolios, Core and Guay show that these proxies capture 
more than 99 percent of the variation in option portfolio value 
and sensitivities. A potential limitation of their analysis is that 
they assume, consistent with most prior literature beginning 
with Jensen and Murphy (1990), that changes in the Black-
Scholes value of an option portfolio is an appropriate measure 
of an employee’s incentives to increase the stock price. We 
discuss the appropriateness of the Black-Scholes model in 
detail in Section 4.2.
Although estimating these proxies is straightforward, in 
recent years a debate has ensued over how to transform the 
proxy into a measure of equity incentives. Most researchers, 
beginning with Jensen and Murphy (1990), use the Black and 
Scholes (1973) method to value an executive’s option portfolio, 
and measure the executive’s incentives to increase the stock 
price by how much the total value of the executive’s stock and 
option portfolio changes with a small change in the stock price. 
Studies such as Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), and Yermack (1995) measure incentives from equity 
holdings as fractional ownership, which is the dollar change in 
the value of the executive’s stock and option portfolio wealth 
for a dollar change in firm value. This approach is motivated by 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) model of the firm with a risk-
neutral agent. Under the assumption that monitoring is costly 
and imperfect, the agent has an incentive to consume 
perquisites, such as luxurious office space and jet aircraft, so 
long as the agent owns less than 100 percent of the firm. This is 
because he or she gets all or most of the benefits from the 
perquisite but bears only a fraction of the costs through owner-
ship claims. Under this theory, agency costs are mitigated when 
the risk-neutral manager owns a large percentage of the firm so 
that the manager internalizes the cost of the perquisites 
consumed. Data showing small fractional ownership lead 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) to conclude that CEO equity 
incentives are too weak to provide economically meaningful 
incentives and lead Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) to 
conclude that CEO ownership is generally “too low.”4
One problem with this theory is that all CEO actions are 
assumed to be equally difficult to monitor. For example, there 
is an implicit, but untenable, assumption that it is equally 
difficult for the shareholders to observe that the CEO has 
bought a jet aircraft for personal consumption as it is for them 
to observe whether the CEO spent enough time evaluating a 
new project before he adopted it. Second, when CEOs are 
wealth-constrained, a small fraction of firm value translates 
into a large fraction of CEO wealth. Hall and Liebman (1998) 
argue that managerial risk-aversion and wealth constraints 
imply that managers with large dollar holdings of equity can 
have powerful incentives even when their fractional share 
holdings are small. (We discuss the implications of wealth-
based contracting in greater detail below.) This theoretical 
notion can be approximated for equity incentives by 
computing the dollar change in the value of the executive’s 
stock and option portfolio for a percentage change in firm value. 
For example, an executive with $10 million in stock holdings 
would experience a $1 million change in wealth for a 10 percent 
change in stock price.
It is important to keep in mind that the two measures are 
transformations of one another. When computed for stock 
holdings only, the dollar change in executive wealth for a 
dollar change in firm value is proportional to the fraction of 
shares outstanding owned by the executive. The dollar change 
measure can be converted to a percentage change measure by 
multiplying it by the market value of the firm. For example, 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Yermack (1995) estimate the 
sensitivity of a CEO’s holdings of stock and options to stock 
price with respect to a $1,000 change in the value of common 
stock. As such, the percentage change measure is equal to the 
Jensen and Murphy measure multiplied by the market value of 
the firm and divided by $100,000.
Baker and Hall (1998) shed much light on this debate by 
showing that the appropriateness of the two approaches to 
measuring incentives is determined by how CEO actions are 
assumed to affect firm value. For example, when a CEO’s 
actions primarily affect firm dollar returns (such as perquisite 
consumption through the purchase of a corporate jet), the 
appropriate measure of the CEO’s incentives is his percentage 
holding in the firm. In contrast, when CEO actions primarily 
affect firm percentage returns (such as the implementation of 
firm strategy), the appropriate measure of CEO incentives is 
her dollar holdings in the firm (Baker and Hall 1998, pp. 8-9). 
While there are likely to be situations in which the measures 
complement each other (for example, fractional share holdings 
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value-destroying action), dollar holdings are likely to be the 
more important incentive measure in a wide variety of 
situations.
3.3 Determinants of Equity-Based Incentives
A fundamental reason for the use of equity incentives is the 
desire by firms to link changes in executive wealth directly to 
changes in stock price, thereby providing executives with 
incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. Obviously, if 
shareholders (or the board of directors) could directly observe 
the firm’s opportunities and the executives’ actions and know 
beforehand which actions would maximize shareholder wealth, 
no incentives (including equity incentives) would be necessary. 
However, because shareholders do not know and cannot 
specify every action an executive should take in every scenario 
(that is, the first-best contract cannot be implemented), the 
firm must instead delegate many of these choices to the 
executive, who presumably has superior information about 
many of these decisions. To motivate the executive to take 
actions that are in the best interests of the shareholders, 
compensation risk is imposed on the executive by linking the 
executive’s wealth to firm performance (that is, the second-best 
contract is used).
The use of second-best contracts immediately leads to the 
key question of how firms determine the appropriate level of 
equity incentives to give an executive. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) hypothesize that required levels of managerial equity 
ownership are related to firm size and monitoring difficulty. 
They argue that there is an optimal firm size and optimal level 
of managerial ownership given the firm’s factor inputs and 
product markets. If the optimal firm size is large, the dollar 
cost of a fixed proportionate equity ownership is also 
correspondingly large (that is, it is more costly for large firms 
to require that managers own a given percentage than it is for 
small firms).
In addition, larger firms require more talented managers 
who are more highly compensated (Smith and Watts 1992) and 
consequently are expected to be wealthier (Baker and Hall 
1998). Under the typical assumption that individuals’ utility 
functions exhibit declining absolute risk-aversion (such as 
constant relative risk-aversion), CEOs of larger firms are 
expected to have higher dollar incentives from equity (Baker 
and Hall 1998; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999). Both 
studies find that CEO portfolio incentives, measured as dollar 
equity ownership, increase at a decreasing rate with firm size.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) also hypothesize that firms 
operating in less predictable or noisier environments have 
higher monitoring costs. Because of these higher monitoring 
costs, Demsetz and Lehn argue that firms in noisier 
environments will exhibit a higher concentration of ownership, 
but managerial risk-aversion implies that ownership levels will 
increase at a decreasing rate with noise.5 A related argument is 
Smith and Watts’ (1992) hypothesis that the prevalence of 
growth opportunities within firms makes it more difficult for 
shareholders or outside board members to determine the 
appropriateness of managers’ actions. Requiring managers to 
hold stock and options lowers monitoring costs by giving 
managers incentives to maximize shareholder value. Smith and 
Watts hypothesize and find a positive relation between firms’ 
growth opportunities and the degree to which firms use equity 
incentives to tie a manager’s wealth to firm value. Gaver and 
Gaver (1993), Mehran (1995), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and 
Palia (1999), and Palia (2001) provide additional support for 
this hypothesis by documenting a positive association between 
proxies for growth opportunities and CEOs’ equity incentives.
Thus, in contrast to the allegations of many media pundits 
(and some academics) who assert that incentive levels are 
random, arbitrary, or out of equilibrium, empirical evidence 
suggests that, on average, firms base their equity incentives on 
systematic and theoretically sensible economic factors. Any 
research that assumes that incentives are systematically “too 
high” or “too low” is effectively assuming that incentives are 
not in equilibrium. (This idea is covered in detail in Section 4.) 
Furthermore, the empirical findings suggest that it is 
inappropriate to use a single firm characteristic, such as firm 
size, to benchmark executive equity holdings against mean or 
median equity holdings. Instead, the regression models reveal 
that multiple firm characteristics, such as size and proxies for 
investment opportunities, must be weighted to construct a 
prediction of the expected level of equity incentives.
3.4 Equity Grants and Incentives
to Increase Stock Price
The above discussion suggests at least one motivation for why 
firms make new grants of stock-based compensation, such as 
stock options and restricted stock. Specifically, over time, 
managers’ equity incentives can become misaligned with the 
level of incentives desired by shareholders. This misalignment 
occurs because firm and/or manager characteristics that drive 
target incentive levels change (for example, the firm grows over 
time or the firm’s investment opportunity set may exogenously 
shift). In addition, managers periodically sell and buy stock, 
and exercise options to satisfy personal consumption. Finally, 
the incentives provided by a given portfolio of stock and 
options change over time. For example, the incentives provided 
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volatility, and the time remaining until the options expire. If 
firms and executives agree on a target level of equity incentives, 
one might expect that firms use grants of stock and options to 
adjust portfolio incentives to the target level. Core and Guay 
(1999) find that new grants of equity incentives are negatively 
associated with the degree to which the CEO’s portfolio 
incentives exceed an empirical estimate of the CEO’s target 
incentive levels.
3.5 The Use of Stock Options to Add 
Convexity to Compensation Contracts
Smith and Stulz (1985) and many others have recognized that 
a potential cost of management stock holdings is that the linear 
payoff structure creates a potential incentive for a risk-averse 
manager to take actions that reduce firm risk or to reject risky, 
positive net present value (NPV) projects. Amihud and Lev 
(1981) hypothesize and May (1995) presents empirical 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers with 
very large stock holdings undertake risk-reducing acquisitions. 
Tufano (1996) finds that hedging activities in the gold industry 
are more extensive when CEOs have larger stock holdings. 
Thus, it seems optimal to add convexity to managers’ contracts 
when there is a link between a manager’s effort choice and 
variance (for example, Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia [1999], 
Feltham and Wu [2001], and Lambert and Larcker [2001a]). 
Similarly, convex compensation contracts are also likely when 
the manager can make project selection choices to affect firm 
risk (for example, Lambert [1986], Hirshleifer and Suh [1992], 
and Core and Qian [2001]).
These theories also suggest that the optimal amount of 
convexity in a compensation contract depends on a variety of 
firm and CEO characteristics. Innes (1990) shows that even if 
an agent is risk-neutral, a limited liability restriction can 
introduce convexity into an optimal contract. In the traditional 
moral hazard agency model with a risk-neutral principal and a 
risk-averse and effort-averse agent (for example, Holmstrom 
[1979]), the form of the optimal contract is determined by the 
distribution function that maps managerial actions into the 
stock price and the manager’s risk-aversion. The contract is 
more convex when the distribution function is more skewed 
and when the manager is less risk-averse (Holmstrom 1979; 
Hemmer et al. 1999). For contracts that consist of a 
combination of stock and options, Lambert and Larcker 
(2001a) show that the “optimal” exercise price for a single large 
option grant is generally higher than the stock price at the date 
of the grant (that is, the options are “out of the money”). 
Core and Qian (2001) show that when there are no growth 
opportunities, the CEO’s contract contains little convexity per 
unit of slope, but when there are large growth options that are 
difficult to evaluate, the CEO’s contract is both more convex 
and more steeply sloped. Consistent with the general 
predictions of these theories, Guay (1999) shows that firms 
with greater growth opportunities provide more risk-taking 
incentives and that firm risk is indeed greater when managers 
hold more risk-taking incentives.
3.6 Other Reasons for Equity Compensation
Since options and restricted stock are valuable, they can also be 
used to provide executives with compensation. Even when an 
executive already has the appropriate level of incentives, the 
firm may choose to compensate her with equity as a substitute 
for cash. One would expect that it is more costly to use risky 
claims, such as stock options or restricted stock, instead of cash 
to compensate a risk-averse agent for past performance. (We 
discuss below that there is much debate over the magnitude of 
this cost differential.) However, because stock options and 
restricted stock require no contemporaneous cash payout, 
firms with cash constraints are expected to use these forms of 
compensation as a substitute for cash pay (for example, 
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan [1996] and Core and Guay [1999, 
2001a]). Implicit in these arguments is the assumption that the 
firm’s cost of capital is lower when it “sells” a small amount of 
stock to an employee in lieu of cash compensation than if it 
were to sell a similar amount of stock to the market. Many 
high-growth firms argue that stock-based compensation allows 
them to supplement cash compensation and compete for high-
quality employees.
Stock and option grants can also be driven by tax motivations. 
For example, grants of options (and grants of restricted stock 
that are tied to performance-contingent plans) are not subject 
to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) $1 million 
limit on the tax deductibility of fixed compensation. Further, 
when future corporate tax rates are expected to be higher, the 
future tax deduction from deferred compensation can be 
favorable relative to the immediate tax deduction received 
from cash compensation.6 Therefore, the use of stock-based 
compensation is expected to be less costly for firms with low 
marginal tax rates. Yermack (1995), Matsunaga (1995), 
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1996), and Bryan, Hwang, and 
Lilien (2000) find that the use of stock options is greater for 
firms with lower marginal tax rates.
Finally, firms may substitute stock option compensation for 
other forms of compensation because of the financial 
accounting treatment of stock options. Specifically, unlike 
other types of compensation—such as cash pay and restricted 
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value of stock option grants is generally not expensed, but is 
instead disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements. 
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1996) and Core and Guay (1999, 
2001a) provide some evidence that option grants are larger 
when it is more costly for firms to have low earnings (because 
of dividend constraints or debt covenants). Further, for reasons 
that are not well understood, some firms appear to believe that 
the distinction between recognition and disclosure of option 
expense is economically important. Carter and Lynch (2001b) 
provide direct evidence that firms are willing to incur 
economic costs to obtain favorable accounting treatment for 
stock options when they show that firms accelerate option 
repricings to obtain such treatment.
4. Controversies, Unresolved Issues, 
and Topics for Future Research
4.1 Equity Incentives and Firm Performance
There is presently no theoretical or empirical consensus on 
how stock options and managerial equity ownership affect firm 
performance. Studies of this issue generally take one of two 
perspectives. Studies such as Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988) argue that, on average, observed CEO equity ownership 
and incentives are “too low.” If this were true, most firms 
would increase firm value by increasing CEO equity incentives. 
In this setting, CEO equity ownership and firm performance 
should exhibit a positive association because high- (low-) 
ownership CEOs are closer (further away) from optimal 
incentive levels.
Morck et al. (1988) find some evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis, except among CEOs with very large fractional 
equity ownership. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find evidence 
of a positive relationship between increases in ownership and 
firm performance as long as managerial ownership is less than 
50 percent. Frye (2001) finds evidence that firms that provide 
more equity-based compensation to employees perform better. 
Sesil, Kroumova, Kruse, and Blasi (2000) find mixed evidence 
that firms using options extensively perform better, and Ittner 
et al. (2001) find that the relationship between option grants 
and firm performance varies across organizational levels within 
a sample of new-economy firms. A limitation of this research is 
that the causal direction of the relation between equity 
incentives and performance is unclear (Kole 1996). Rather than 
higher equity incentives producing better future firm 
performance, it may be the case that firms expecting better 
future performance grant more equity (for example, Yermack 
[1997]). It would be worthwhile for researchers to analyze this 
important question using a simultaneous equation or transfer 
function approach (incorporating leads and lags) to provide 
evidence on the directionality of the function linking equity 
ownership with firm performance. Obviously, one problem 
with this econometric approach is that it is necessary to specify 
both the structural and reduced-form equations, along with the 
selection of appropriate instrumental variables (Himmelberg 
et al. 1999).
Also consistent with this hypothesis is evidence of a positive 
association between management stock and option holdings, 
and firm leverage (for example, Mehran [1992] and Berger, 
Ofek, and Yermack [1997]). Berger et al. (p. 1437) conjecture 
that firms generally have too little leverage and that share-
holders value increases in leverage associated with increases in 
ownership. The authors provide evidence that increases in 
option holdings, but not increases in stock ownership, are 
associated with increases in leverage.
Related literature in corporate finance examines the 
performance of companies completing a leveraged buyout (for 
example, Kaplan [1989] and Smith [1990]) and reverse- 
leveraged buyouts (for example, Holthausen and Larcker 
[1996]). These changes in organizational structure are 
generally associated with large shifts in the level of equity 
owned by executives (in both dollar terms and as a percentage 
of firm value). The results of these studies reveal large increases 
(decreases) in performance for firms completing a leveraged 
buyout (reverse-leveraged buyout). Moreover, the perfor-
mance consequences are associated with changes in managerial 
equity ownership.
In contrast to studies that view equity incentives as being too 
low, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Core and Guay (1999), and 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) consider an 
alternative prediction about the relationship between equity 
incentives and performance. These authors conjecture that 
firms and managers contract optimally, and that managerial-
ownership levels are set, on average, at the value-maximizing 
level.7 In these studies, equity-incentive levels are determined 
by firm and manager characteristics. For example, as noted 
above, higher (lower) ownership is predicted and observed in 
firms where more (less) monitoring is required. From this 
perspective, no simple ex-ante relationship between ownership 
and firm performance is expected. That is, low-ownership 
firms are not necessarily expected to perform poorly because 
these firms do not require high-powered equity incentives to 
ensure that managers take appropriate actions. Similarly, high-
ownership firms use high-powered equity incentives to resolve 
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incentive levels will allow them to achieve positive abnormal 
performance. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) present 
evidence to support the view that one would not expect to see 
an association between performance and the level of incentives 
in equilibrium. However, as discussed by Zhou (2001), future 
research is necessary to examine the appropriateness (goodness 
of fit) for the structure imposed by Himmelberg et al. (1999).
It can be argued that a problem with cross-sectional studies 
of the determinants of equity incentives is that they provide 
little evidence of whether firms systematically require incentive 
levels that are “too high” or “too low.” That is, incentive levels 
could vary across firms in ways that are consistent with 
economic theory and yet still be on average too high or low. 
However, if this were the case, one would expect it to be readily 
documented by studies that examine the relationship between 
equity incentive levels and firm performance. For example, if 
all firms imposed excessively large equity incentives on 
executives, firms with the lowest incentive levels should be 
closest to optimal and have the better performance, whereas 
firms with the highest incentive levels should be furthest from 
optimal and have the worst performance. The fact that 
empirical researchers have had difficulty documenting a robust 
relationship between incentives and performance suggests that 
the data are not well described by a simple story about 
incentives being “too high” or “too low” for most firms.
The two schools of thought about the expected relationship 
between performance and incentives make very different 
assumptions about the nature of the adjustment costs of 
correcting suboptimal contracts. For example, Morck et al. 
(1988) implicitly assume that adjustment costs are so great that 
firms cannot recontract when incentives are not properly 
aligned. Therefore, these firms deliver lower cash flows to their 
shareholders, and their market values are lower.8 Conversely, 
by concentrating on the equilibrium behavior of optimizing 
firms, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) assume that firms can 
continuously recontract because there are no adjustment costs. 
The choice of one of these two extremes drives the design and 
interpretation of the results of any study that examines the 
relationship between ownership and performance. It is perhaps 
not surprising that there is no consensus on the performance 
consequences of managerial equity ownership.
As an alternative approach, we suggest that firms choose 
optimal managerial equity incentives when they contract 
(consistent with the literature that predicts no link between 
ownership and performance), but that transaction costs 
prohibit continuous recontracting (consistent with the 
literature that documents a strong relation between ownership 
and performance). Because ownership is periodically 
reoptimized, we expect no association between ownership and 
firm performance in a cross-sectional regression that controls 
for the endogenous determinants of firms’ optimal ownership 
levels. However, because contracting is not continuous, firms’ 
ownership levels gradually deviate from the optimal level. This 
means that a subset of firms always has misaligned incentives 
but recognizes that the costs associated with recontracting 
sometimes exceed the benefits. Given these assumptions, an 
effective sample for testing for a link between ownership and 
firm value is a set of firms for which managerial equity 
ownership levels are too low (high), but then recontract to 
increase (decrease) ownership. For this sample of firms, 
required adjustments in managers’ ownership should increase 
cash flows to shareholders and increase firm value because 
firms should rationally recontract only when the benefits 
associated with better aligned incentives are greater than the 
costs of recontracting.
Core and Larcker (forthcoming) explore this approach in 
the context of target ownership plans. They argue that if target 
ownership plans improve managerial incentives, adoption 
should have favorable operating performance consequences 
for the firm. They assume that when a firm with low managerial 
ownership requires that managers increase their ownership, 
this increase mitigates agency problems and motivates 
managers to select actions that are more consistent with 
shareholder objectives. Their evidence is consistent with this 
hypothesis.
Overall, despite considerable prior research, the 
performance consequences of equity ownership remain open 
to question. Clearly, the need for high-powered incentives 
varies across firms and thus greater equity ownership by a 
particular executive does not necessarily imply that agency 
costs are lower or that performance will be stronger. However, 
empirical evidence that equity incentives vary across firms in 
ways consistent with economic theory does not preclude the 
possibility that costly contracting allows incentives periodically 
to become misaligned or that some firms contract sub-
optimally with their executives. Exploring the extent of these 
latter possibilities is an area for future research.
4.2 Executive versus Market Valuation
of Equity and the Efficiency
of Equity Compensation
Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) point out that the 
manager’s entire portfolio of stochastic and nonstochastic 
wealth is important for contracting purposes. The study 
models a firm that gives a risky contract to a manager who has 
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show that the risk-averse and undiversified manager has a 
certainty-equivalent value for the contract that is less than the 
risk-neutral firm’s value of the contract (or, equivalently, the 
cost to the firm of providing the contract). These results are 
consistent with the standard agency result that a contract that 
imposes risk on an agent is more costly than a contract that 
imposes no risk.
In contrast to Lambert et al., most agency models do not 
explicitly consider outside wealth: the contract has to meet the 
agent’s reservation utility in expectation (for example, 
Holmstrom [1979]). Because all executives have outside 
wealth, this simplification can lead to some confusion in 
empirical tests of these models. However, these models can be 
expanded to incorporate outside wealth by assuming that the 
agent’s reservation utility is greater when the agent has more 
outside wealth (for example, Lambert and Larcker [2001a]). 
The optimal contract in this setting unwinds some of the 
agent’s initial wealth and replaces it with a precise exposure to 
firm risk. For example, the contract might require the agent to 
sell her investment in the market portfolio and purchase a 
position in the firm’s stock.
A central insight of Lambert et al. is that in a contracting 
setting, it is costly for the principal to ignore the structure of the 
manager’s wealth. For typical power utility functions, Lambert 
et al. show that the manager’s valuation of an option can be less 
than 50 percent of the Black-Scholes value when the manager is 
constrained to hold 50 percent of his wealth in firm stock. The 
valuation is lower for managers who are more risk-averse and 
less diversified. Finally, Lambert et al. provide evidence that 
giving an undiversified agent a stock option can lead to 
incentives to actually reduce variance, as opposed to the more 
typical assumption that an agent with a stock option has an 
incentive to increase variance. This last finding partly results 
from the authors’ assumption that the agent can reduce firm 
variance without changing its expected return. In the Black-
Scholes model, an option is made more valuable when variance 
increases because of the assumption that there is a risk-return 
tradeoff in which expected returns increase when variance 
increases. Lambert et al. de-link this risk-return tradeoff, and 
show that an agent prefers a decrease in variance when there is 
no decrease in expected returns. This result does not depend on 
risk-aversion, as even a risk-neutral agent would prefer a 
variance decrease for an in-the-money option, provided that 
the variance decrease did not reduce the expected stock return. 
The analysis of Lambert et al. and subsequent work by Hall and 
Murphy (forthcoming), Hall and Murphy (2000), Carpenter 
(2000), and others illustrate the importance of considering the 
manager’s total portfolio of wealth when valuing a stock option 
portfolio from the perspective of the manager.
Hall and Murphy (forthcoming) replicate the analysis in 
Lambert et al. (1991) and use it to make some normative 
prescriptions about the structure of current compensation 
arrangements. Hall and Murphy claim that stock options are a 
wasteful and inefficient means of conveying compensation. The 
intuition is that paying compensation in stock or options to a 
risk-averse executive can be more costly to the firm than 
delivering to the executive the same value in cash. This is 
unquestionably true if the effect of the compensation is solely 
to increase the amount of risk imposed on the executive and 
the incentive effects of the stock options are ignored. However, 
some firms may deliver compensation in the form of equity 
rather than cash (for example, to conserve cash). In these cases, 
because the intended purpose of the equity compensation is not 
to increase risk imposed on the executive, the firm likely would 
allow the recipient to rebalance her portfolio so that the firm-
specific risk that the recipient was exposed to after the grant 
was the same as it was before the grant (Core and Guay 2001b). 
As described below, executive valuation of equity compensa-
tion in this latter scenario is likely to be substantially different 
than valuation in the former setting.
Similar to the Lambert et al. (1991) study, Hall and Murphy 
(forthcoming) assume that an executive has wealth of 
$20 million and that the only two investment choices available 
to him are firm stock and the risk-free asset. Although the 
executive would prefer to hold less, he is exogenously specified 
to hold $10 million of wealth in assets that are perfectly 
correlated with the firm’s stock price (that is, stock holdings 
and the present value of compensation from the firm). 
Further, Hall and Murphy assume that the executive is 
exogenously constrained from selling any existing holdings 
and cannot rebalance portfolio holdings when he receives a 
$1 million compensation payment in the form of options. In 
other words, the firm gives the executive compensation, but 
simultaneously increases the risk imposed on him by not 
allowing portfolio rebalancing.
Now consider how the executive values the $1 million 
option grant in this setting. After the grant, he has $11 million 
in equity, which is further away from his preferred level of 
stock holdings. Because the executive cannot implement any 
portfolio rebalancing and is not provided with a compen-
sating risk premium, he values this option grant at less than 
its Black-Scholes value of $1 million. Since the value received 
by the executive can be substantially below the cost to the firm, 
Hall and Murphy conclude that equity grants are an expensive 
form of compensation. However, as noted above, this grant 
increases incentives and is not pure compensation. Further, 
because stock option grants impose more risk on executives per 
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imposed by stock grants, Hall and Murphy conclude that stock 
option compensation is an inefficient form of equity 
compensation. In addition, they conclude that the use of Black-
Scholes deltas overstates the incentives provided by an 
executive’s option portfolio, and suggest that researchers must 
risk-adjust compensation payments. This conclusion again 
follows from the assumption that the risk-averse executive 
cannot rebalance his portfolio following an increase in its 
value, and therefore will discount this value increase.
It is important to note that Hall and Murphy implicitly 
assume that the option grant improves incentives: “If the 
grant provides incentives that shift the distribution, and if the 
shift is not already incorporated into stock prices as of the grant 
date, we will underestimate [emphasis added] both the cost and 
value of the option” (forthcoming, section 2, footnote 13). As 
discussed above, this assumption that all firms have too few 
incentives is equivalent to an assumption that firm incentives 
are out of equilibrium. If one believed that incentives were in 
equilibrium, one would not ex ante expect that an equity grant 
would improve incentives. Further, if one believed that 
incentives were in equilibrium, one would not expect the firm 
to restrict the executive from selling stock to rebalance 
incentives following price increases.
Core and Guay (2001b) relax the exogenous assumptions of 
Lambert et al. (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2001), and instead 
assume that the equity grant is made as compensation under a 
contract between the firm and the executive. Specifically, Core 
and Guay assume that the executive’s holdings of $10 million 
in firm equity are not exogenously specified, but are instead 
part of a second-best optimal employment contract, which 
requires her to hold exactly $10 million of equity incentives. 
Finally, they assume that the executive is allowed/required to 
rebalance portfolio holdings over time to maintain the agreed 
level of incentives. Now consider how this executive values a 
$1 million grant of equity. Because she is allowed to implement 
portfolio rebalancing and sell $1 million of existing stock 
holdings at their market value and still maintain the contracted 
level of firm equity, the executive will value the equity grant at 
its market value. Using similar logic and assumptions, Core 
and Guay show that the executive values a change in the value 
of her stock and option portfolio at its market value. This 
conclusion again follows from the assumption that the risk-
averse executive can rebalance her portfolio following an 
increase in its value back to the contractual, second-best, 
optimal level of incentives. Thus, under these assumptions, the 
Black-Scholes sensitivity of stock and option portfolio value to 
stock price—as typically used by researchers—is a reasonable 
approximation for executives’ incentives to increase the stock 
price.
A key assumption in the Core and Guay (2001b) analysis is 
that because the executive is allowed to rebalance to the target 
incentive level, there are no incentive effects induced by the 
$1 million grant that increase or decrease the principal’s 
expected payout. If this assumption does not hold (for 
example, as in Hall and Murphy [2001]), the stock option grant 
changes incentives and affects the principal’s payout, and the 
analysis becomes considerably more complicated.
These two arguments represent polar cases, and the relative 
applicability of the two approaches depends on one’s 
assumptions and the specifics of the situation under study. The 
Hall and Murphy (2001) analysis most directly applies to the 
cost of imposing additional incentives on an executive 
(assuming that this increase is optimal from the perspective of 
shareholders). However, this approach is not directly related to 
the use of equity as compensation because compensation relates 
to the payment made to executives, not the risk imposed. The 
opposite is true for the Core and Guay (2001b) approach. Their 
analysis addresses the use of equity grants to provide 
compensation, and assumes that there is an equilibrium level of 
incentives and that the executive has an ex-ante contract that 
requires him or her to hold this level of equity incentives. 
Grants of incentives following the contract do not change the 
level of incentives required, and accordingly these grants are 
valued at market value because they impose no extra risk. 
Further, the Core and Guay argument assumes that the costs of 
selling stock to rebalance the level of risk imposed on the 
executive are small (so that the executive can rebalance 
frequently and completely), and the executive’s value of the 
grant is reduced as these costs increase. Rebalancing costs 
include trading commissions and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and other (implicit or explicit) restrictions 
on when stock can be sold. Core and Guay (forthcoming b) also 
show that, provided the executive can rebalance once shortly 
following the equity grant, the executive is expected to value a 
typical newly granted option at 95 percent of its market value.
The Hall and Murphy (2001) analysis may be applicable to 
very large option grants (“mega-grants”) that impose excess 
incentives beyond the optimal level that the executive cannot 
shed. However, mega-grants may be a case where the executive 
has control of the board and uses this grant to extract wealth 
from shareholders. (It is frequently hypothesized that options 
are a means of rent extraction—for example, Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker [1999]—but as we discuss in Section 
4.6, this hypothesis lacks an explanation of why risky option 
grants are a preferred means of rent extraction.) In either case, 
when the effect of a compensation payment is to impose extra 
risk on the executive, there is no doubt that the executive values 
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this extra risk is inefficient, the compensation payment is 
inefficient.
A key issue in the debate over the valuation and efficiency of 
equity compensation is the extent to which executives actually 
rebalance their stock and option portfolios in response to 
equity grants. Although empirical evidence suggests that 
executives do rebalance their portfolios in response to stock 
and option grants (for example, Janakiraman [1998], Heath, 
Huddart, and Lang [1999], Ofek and Yermack [2000], and 
Core and Guay [2001a]), the extent of this activity and how it 
varies cross-sectionally remain open questions.
Finally, a problem with both the Core and Guay, and Hall 
and Murphy approaches is that they do not provide explicit 
models that explain why stock options arise in an optimal 
contracting setting. Both approaches impose some exogenous 
structure and assume that the principal-agent problem is 
solved by a contract that is linear in the stock price. This 
assumption focuses on the fact that option grants and 
restricted stock grants provide incentives to increase the stock 
price, but ignores the convexity and risk-taking incentives 
created by the options (as noted above). The continued 
development of optimal contracting models for stock options 
and equity grants, and careful testing of their empirical 
implications, would be very helpful for understanding the 
valuation and efficiency of equity compensation.
4.3 The Debate over Relative Performance 
Evaluation
A widespread concern among both practitioners and 
academics is that executive portfolios lack relative performance 
evaluation (RPE) or, equivalently, that stock and stock options 
gain value not only because the firm performs well, but also 
because the market rises. For example, Abowd and Kaplan 
(1999) remark:
Stock options reward stock price appreciation regardless 
of the performance of the economy or sector. Why 
should CEOs be rewarded for doing nothing more than 
riding the wave of a strong bull market? If the exercise 
price could be linked to measures like the S&P 500, or an 
index of close product-market competitors, then 
executives would be rewarded for gains in stock price in 
excess of those explainable by market factors outside 
their control. If market-wide stock movements could be 
netted out of executive incentive schemes, then 
equivalent incentives could be provided while reducing 
the volatility of the executives’ portfolios (p. 162).
Murphy (1999) and Gillan (2001) echo a similar perspective. 
Abowd and Kaplan suggest that current practices are wasteful 
and that research could “lend insight into the value of resources 
squandered [emphasis added] by a failure to implement relative 
performance evaluation plans” (p. 163).
A central tenet of agency theory is Holmstrom’s (1982) 
prediction that compensation contracts are expected to filter 
out systematic noise through relative performance evaluation. 
Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992), Antle and Smith 
(1986), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), and others have found 
relatively little evidence that the annual bonus portion of 
executive compensation exhibits RPE. However, given our 
observation above that most of a CEO’s incentives come from 
his or her equity portfolio, the lack of explicit RPE in a bonus 
payment does not imply the lack of implicit RPE in the overall 
contract. Casual empiricism, such as in Abowd and Kaplan’s 
study, observes large stock and option portfolios, and assumes 
there is no RPE. That is, if firms use RPE, one might expect to 
see explicitly indexed CEO contracts, where the CEO holds 
securities that only expose him to idiosyncratic firm 
performance and effectively remove systematic risk from the 
CEO’s performance evaluation. We argue below that while 
there is no explicit RPE in CEOs’ stock and option portfolios, 
there is considerable implicit RPE in these portfolios.
A potential explanation for the apparent rarity of RPE 
equity incentives follows from the observation that CEOs are 
expected to hold equity portfolios that reflect the terms of their 
employment contracts, not the portfolios they would choose in 
the absence of constraints. Portfolio theory predicts that a 
rational, risk-averse CEO would hold no stock in her firm (in 
the absence of private information), and instead would have all 
of her wealth invested in a diversified portfolio.9 That is, a CEO 
will generally hold a substantial quantity of stock in her firm 
only if required to do so as part of the compensation contract 
(for example, for incentive reasons).10 Under certain 
assumptions, this form of employment contract is reasonably 
consistent with an RPE prediction that the optimal contract 
requires the CEO to hold more than her preferred exposure to 
the firm’s idiosyncratic (nonmarket) return.
To see this, imagine that a firm hires a new CEO with $100 
in outside wealth that the executive prefers to hold in the 
market index (with return  ). (For simplicity of exposition, 
we assume that the CEO prefers to hold 100 percent of his 
outside wealth in the market index, but the same argument 
applies if the CEO prefers to hold a combination of the risk-free 
asset and the market index.) Suppose that the employment 
contract with this new CEO requires the purchase of $50 of the 
firm’s stock, which the executive finances by selling $50 of his 
market holdings.11 Under the simplifying assumption that the 
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firm has a beta equal to 1, the stock return is  . 
Accordingly, after fulfilling the contract, the executive owns 
$50 in the market portfolio with return   and $50 in firm 
stock with return  . This new portfolio is equivalent to 
the $100 market portfolio that was originally held, plus a new 
$50 exposure to the idiosyncratic component of the firm’s 
return  . The executive’s wealth is no more correlated with 
market movements after the contract than that preferred in the 
absence of the contract. The only aspect that has changed is that 
the executive now holds a $50 exposure to the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk, which is exactly the prediction of RPE. The 
implicit indexing of the executive’s holdings of the firm’s stock 
is not observed because the structure of the executive’s outside 
wealth and preferences is not observed (Core, Guay, and 
Verrecchia 2000; Core and Guay 2001b; Jin 2001). This analysis 
suggests that executive contracts are likely to be more 
consistent with RPE than might be observed by casual 
empiricism or by previous empirical RPE research that has not 
considered the structure of the executives’ other wealth.
The explicit use of RPE in executive compensation contracts 
(for example, indexed stock options) is quite uncommon. 
Johnson and Tian (2000) note some possible reasons for this 
empirical observation. Firms face several potentially costly 
implementation issues with respect to indexed options. For 
example, an observable nonmanipulable benchmark index 
must be specified that captures common uncertainty beyond 
the executive’s control (for example, Dye [1992]). Indexed 
options can create greater incentives to increase risk than 
standard options. Furthermore, as discussed below, indexed 
options require the firm to use variable financial accounting 
that results in compensation expenses for options. A dis-
advantage of indexed stock option contracts would be evident 
if the recognition of accounting expenses is important to the 
firm. Nevertheless, the extent of RPE in executive compen-
sation contracts is an important issue that deserves further 
research.
4.4 Do Firms Contract over CEO Wealth?
A key issue in understanding the efficiency of equity-based 
compensation and incentives is to determine whether firms 
contract over CEO wealth. We hypothesize that an efficient 
contract varies the amount of incentives given to a CEO as a 
function of the CEO’s total wealth (as well as a variety of other 
parameters). To demonstrate the intuition behind this claim, 
we make the simplifying assumption that the optimal contract 





would contract with a CEO who has constant relative risk-
aversion. Given that the CEO has constant relative risk-
aversion, and conditional on firm characteristics and CEO 
effort-aversion, the optimal linear contract would expose some 
fixed proportion of the CEO’s wealth to firm risk. This risk 
exposure would be equivalent to requiring the CEO to own 
stock with value equal to a fixed proportion (say, 60 percent) of 
his or her wealth.12 Now suppose that there are two CEOs who 
have the same wealth, the same constant relative risk-aversion 
utility functions, the same marginal product, and the same cost 
of effort. Each CEO has the same efficient contract. Then one 
CEO inherits a lot of money, but the second loses all outside 
wealth in a divorce. Unless they recontract or rebalance, both 
CEOs have incentives to take actions that do not maximize firm 
value, the first by working less and the second by taking fewer 
risks. Only if CEOs have constant absolute risk-aversion (that 
is, a CEO with $100 in wealth values a $10 gamble the same as 
a CEO with $1 million in wealth) would there be no benefit to 
wealth-based contracting.
 Given that the merits of wealth-based contracting are 
compelling, it is interesting to consider what frictions might 
prevent the firm from engaging in this economic approach. To 
write such contracts, the firm requires information about the 
executive’s firm-specific wealth as well as total wealth (inside 
and outside). Contracting over firm-specific wealth would not 
seem to pose much of a problem because these amounts are 
readily observable, given U.S. disclosure and insider-trading 
laws. For example, the SEC legally requires that insiders 
disclose their own firm stock holdings, option exercises, direct 
purchases and sales of stock, and any indirect “quasi-sales” of 
stock through synthetic instruments such as caps or collars 
(Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon 1999). As a result, the majority of 
costs from implementing wealth-based contracting are likely to 
stem from the absence of information on the manager’s outside 
wealth, which he or she is under no legal obligation to disclose. 
However, even if the firm does not know exactly the executive’s 
outside wealth, it can form an unbiased expectation of it. For 
example, the firm is likely to have substantial knowledge about 
previous employment history that provides information about 
outside wealth (such as previous cash compensation, stock 
holdings of previous employers, and number of years 
employed).
Empirical evidence documenting whether firms contract 
over executive wealth would provide important insights into 
the research questions outlined in Sections 4.1-4.3. However, 
to our knowledge, there is little direct empirical evidence on 
this topic. Yet anecdotal evidence from conversations with 
companies and consultants suggests that firms consider their 
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that emerged from bankruptcy and gave a new CEO 1,000,000 
at-the-money options at a low stock price ($10). The options 
produced substantial risk-taking incentives for the CEO and he 
implemented “risky” strategic and operational initiatives 
resulting in substantial stock price appreciation ($100). After 
this outcome, the CEO became very risk-averse and refused to 
adopt risky projects. One explanation was that he wanted to 
“bank” the gain, and any risk or volatility was undesirable to 
him. The board’s solution was to encourage the CEO to 
rebalance his wealth by exercising the in-the-money options. 
The board then replaced the exercised options with new at-the-
money options. Obviously, it is difficult (and inappropriate) to 
generalize from anecdotes such as this one.
Indirect evidence of wealth-based contracting includes 
Baker and Hall (1998) and Core and Guay (1999), who show 
that CEO incentives increase with firm size. Firm size can be 
used as an indirect proxy for CEO wealth as larger firms require 
more talented CEOs who demand greater compensation 
(Smith and Watts 1992). The evidence in Core and Guay 
(1999) that CEO incentives increase with CEO tenure may also 
indicate a relationship between CEO wealth and CEO 
incentives (assuming more senior CEOs have greater wealth). 
The finding that firm-specific indicator variables dramatically 
increase the explanatory power of regressions that model the 
level of equity incentives (for example, Core and Guay [1999] 
and Palia [2001]) is consistent with unobserved heterogeneity 
in CEO wealth being associated with differences in CEO 
incentives. However, this heterogeneity can also be interpreted 
as firm-specific differences in monitoring and contracting 
technology (Himmelberg et al. 1999). Evidence in Core and 
Larcker (forthcoming) that CEO ownership targets are 
typically around five times CEO salary seems to run counter to 
a prediction of wealth-based contracting because CEO salaries 
likely exhibit much lower cross-sectional variation than CEO 
wealth (although firms may use cash pay as a noisy proxy for 
wealth levels).
Finally, recent research by Bettis et al. (1999) as well as 
considerable anecdotal evidence indicate that some CEOs use 
derivative securities such as caps and collars to hedge firm-
specific risk. Consistent with the predictions of efficient 
wealth-based contracting, caps and collars can be an effective 
way to allow executives to rebalance firm-specific risk in cases 
where their firm-specific wealth grows beyond the level implied 
by an efficient contract. However, inconsistent with the 
predictions of efficient wealth-based contracting, in firms with 
poor corporate governance (such as a captured board), CEOs 
may be allowed to engage in these hedging activities even when 
it is not efficient to do so. Furthermore, some CEOs may 
undertake these hedging activities secretly without board 
approval. However, the fact that secret hedging activities are 
likely to run afoul of SEC disclosure rules suggests that this 
behavior is not expected to be widespread. The small sample 
size in Bettis et al. (1999) is consistent with the hypothesis that 
this behavior is limited, or that firms and CEOs are engaging in 
this behavior and not filing required SEC disclosures.
4.5 Repricing Stock Options
Stock option repricing—the practice of resetting the exercise 
price of previously granted options that are significantly out of 
the money—has attracted considerable attention in recent 
years, and is an area of particular concern for institutional 
investors and the business press:
Heavy criticism has come from the financial press and 
from large institutional investors such as the State of 
Wisconsin Investment Board, who argue that resetting is 
tantamount to rewarding management for poor 
performance and that, more importantly, it destroys 
incentives present in the initial contract (Acharya, John, 
and Sundaram 2000, p. 66).
The typical argument against repricings is that firms provide 
options to employees as a form of equity incentives, and these 
incentives are intended to encourage employees to take value-
maximizing actions. When the stock price rises, employees are 
rewarded through the increase in the value of their options. 
However, if options are repriced after the stock price falls, the 
repricing effectively removes the risk originally imposed on the 
executive for incentive purposes, and may be seen as a “reward” 
for poor performance. Thus, critics argue that repricing is an 
inappropriate aspect of the compensation contract. A related 
point consistent with the critics’ perspective is that if the firms 
had not repriced, over half of their sample would have stock 
options that were at the money within two years after the 
repricing event (Chance et al. 2000). This result raises the 
question of whether the repricing is actually necessary. Of 
course, two years is a long time if you lose valuable employees 
to competitors in the interim.
In a counterargument, Saly (1994) and Acharya et al. (2000) 
point out that it is generally optimal to allow a long-term 
contract to be renegotiated, and an ex-ante strategy of repricing 
options following bad outcomes dominates a commitment to 
not recontract. Intuitively, if the outcome is bad and is known 
to be the CEO’s fault, the CEO can be terminated. If the firm 
wishes to keep the CEO following a bad outcome, it will want 
to provide the CEO with optimal incentives, which involves 
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Arguments against repricing also fail to consider the 
retention incentives that options are likely to provide. 
Employee stock options generally have vesting requirements 
that encourage employees to remain with the firm until the 
options are exercisable. Further, employee stock options are 
not tradable or portable. This means that employees must 
exercise any vested options when they leave the firm, thereby 
forfeiting the time value of the options (that is, the employees 
are forced into suboptimal early exercise of the options). As an 
employee builds up an option portfolio over time, these 
retention incentives increase, thereby making it more costly for 
a competitor to hire away the employee. That is, not only 
would a competitor have to pay the employee the market wage, 
the firm would also have to compensate the employee for the 
value forgone from forfeiting unvested options or suboptimally 
exercising options prior to maturity. When the stock price falls 
precipitously, these retention incentives are largely eliminated 
and the probability of employee turnover increases as it 
becomes less costly for competitors to lure employees away. 
Repricing options can serve to reinstate the retention 
incentives. Obviously, repricing is costly from the perspective 
of the firm, but this cost may be substantially smaller than the 
cost of employee turnover (Acharya et al. 2000; Carter and 
Lynch 2001a) and thus repricing can be a value-increasing 
action by the board of directors.
It is important to note that the preceding argument is 
limited in that it assumes the existence of options and ignores 
the fact that restricted stock or other forms of deferred 
compensation could be equally or more effective as a retention 
device. For example, tenure-based restricted stock could have 
the same expected retention value as an equivalent dollar value 
of options, but with less risk.
Finally, we note that although stock options are commonly 
thought to provide retention incentives, there is little direct 
empirical evidence that documents these effects. This is an 
important question for future research to address.
Empirical research on stock option repricing provides 
insight into several issues. First, researchers document the 
frequency of repricing. Using a sample of ExecuComp firms 
from 1992 to 1995, Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) 
find an incidence of repricing of less than 1.5 percent per firm 
year. Chance, Kumar, and Todd (2000) find a lower incidence 
of repricing when they examine 4,000 large firms included in 
the NAARS database from 1985 to 1994. In a sample of firms 
with December 1998 fiscal years obtained from a Lexis-Nexis 
search, Carter and Lynch (2001a) find more than 260 firms that 
reprice. Interestingly, most of the firms are small, high-
technology firms that are not included in the Brenner et al. and 
Chance et al. studies. Consistent with Carter and Lynch, Ittner 
et al. (2001) find that repricing frequency is substantially higher 
for small, hi-tech “new-economy” firms. For example, Ittner 
et al. find that 63.8 percent of the firms in their sample of 217 
firms allow repricing, with shareholder approval required in 
35.4 percent of the cases. Moreover, 59.6 percent of their 
sample have repriced stock options at least once and 31 percent 
have repriced stock options more than once following their 
initial public offering. It is worthwhile to note than a new 
financial accounting treatment of repricings may continue to 
affect their frequency. We discuss this development later.
Prior research finds that repricing follows poor firm-specific 
performance, and some researchers interpret this as evidence 
that repricings are not being undertaken to protect managers 
from industry performance. However, Carter and Lynch 
(2001a) point out that repricings are conditional on bad firm-
specific performance and on the firm’s (unobserved) decision 
not to terminate its employees. If bad managers are fired and 
get no repricing, then for the remaining sample of good 
managers, an observed negative relation between repricing and 
performance could arise spuriously because the managers who 
are punished for poor performance are excluded from the 
sample.
Brenner et al. (2000) and Chance et al. (2000) provide 
evidence that repricings reflect governance problems (that is, 
entrenched managers are more likely to conduct repricings). 
Brenner et al. present evidence that option grants and 
compensation are higher for managers whose options are 
repriced, although this evidence is confounded by the fact
that the repricing dummy variable in their regressions is 
endogenous. However, Carter and Lynch (2001a) match each 
repricing firm against a control firm with out-of-the-money 
options and find no evidence of a correlation between 
repricings and governance problems. A limitation of empirical 
research on repricings, as noted by Brenner et al., is that it does 
not examine CEO turnover. Clearly, it would be desirable for 
future research to examine the motivations to reprice and the 
performance consequences from this board action.
4.6 Manipulation of Exercise Price and 
Timing of Stock Option Grants
Yermack (1997) finds positive abnormal stock returns after 
option grants. The study presents evidence to support the 
hypothesis that these returns occur because managers time the 
option grant prior to the release of good news. By making 
grants before the release of good news, the manager effectively 
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valuable than the at-the-money option that he appears to grant 
himself. Yermack also presents evidence that the resulting 
discount (stock price thirty days following grant minus exercise 
price) is higher for firms with weaker governance (such as 
when the CEO is a member of the compensation committee). 
Complementing Yermack’s argument that managers time 
equity grants around fixed information disclosure dates, 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) suggest that managers also time 
the disclosure of information around fixed equity grant dates. 
Specifically, they provide evidence that firms delay the 
disclosure of good news and accelerate the release of bad news 
prior to stock option award periods.
Although the manipulation effect appears to be statistically 
significant in earlier research, one can question its economic 
significance and whether rational CEOs would engage in risky 
behavior for such a small expected gain. Based on abnormal 
returns for thirty days after the grant date, Aboody and Kasznik 
(2000) find that the disclosure strategy increases the CEO’s 
option award value by a mean of $46,700 (the median is 
$18,500). Aboody and Kasznik argue that this practice amounts 
to compensation that is economically important. The amount 
estimated by them represents 2.5 percent (5.1 percent) of 
reported total CEO compensation of $1,885,600 (CEO option 
compensation of $923,400). Given that the average CEO within 
this sample is likely to have a stock and option portfolio 
worth more than ten times his annual compensation, the 
typical CEO’s wealth gain from this behavior is much less 
than 1 percent. No evidence is reported as to whether total 
CEO compensation for the sample firms engaging in this 
practice is statistically different than for firms not engaging in 
the practice. There is also the issue of expected litigation costs 
in the event of shareholder litigation (discussed below) and the 
potential decrease in the value of their human capital as it 
becomes known that they are “manipulating” corporate 
disclosure.
Yermack argues that this type of granting practice would 
likely be construed as illegal insider trading. If the CEO engages 
in this behavior opportunistically to the detriment of share-
holders and without board permission, the CEO violates his or 
her fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders. If shareholders 
sue the firm over this behavior, the CEO is not covered by the 
directors’ and officers’ firm insurance, and thus could lose his 
entire wealth in litigation. Unless the CEO expects the risk of 
being caught in this behavior to be extremely low, it seems 
highly irrational to engage in such risk-seeking behavior.
Both Yermack (1997, pp. 471-2) and Aboody and Kasznik 
(2000, p. 98) also entertain the possibility that their evidence is 
consistent with managers acting in shareholders’ interests. For 
example, because the incentives to increase stock-price 
volatility created by an in-the-money option are lower than 
those created by an at-the-money option (Lambert et al. 1991), 
firms may wish to issue in-the-money options but prefer to 
avoid the accounting cost of such options. To accomplish this 
objective, they allow managers to time disclosures. Provided 
that CEOs’ and other employees’ compensation are adjusted 
downward to reflect this extra value, one could argue that this 
type of behavior is entirely consistent with firms acting in 
shareholders’ interests by writing efficient contracts that 
minimize a complex array of contracting costs.
Obviously, little is known about the extent to which CEOs 
“self-deal” with stock options. On the one hand, it has been 
argued that the timing of stock option grants is consistent with 
a form of opportunistic insider trading. However, the 
economic importance of this behavior for the executive and the 
firm is very unclear. On the other hand, arguments can be 
made that observed granting behavior simply reflects efficient 
contracting between boards and CEOs. This latter argument is 
bolstered by the seemingly transparent nature of self-dealing 
with options that should make monitoring this activity 
relatively easy. In addition, one might question why CEOs use 
stock options to extract rents given that the payoff from 
options is risky, depends on stock price increases, and generally 
has a vesting period over which the CEO must remain 
employed before he can realize any gains. It would be desirable 
for future research to provide some resolution to manipulation 
behavior by managers in response to stock option grants.
4.7 Does the Accounting for Stock Options 
Cause Inefficient Use of Options?
In a competitive labor market, options are granted to 
employees as a form of compensation in return for services 
rendered. Like any other factor in production, corporations use 
these employee services to earn profits. However, unlike other 
factors in production, firms generally record no accounting 
expense for compensation that is paid in options (assuming the 
grant date stock price is less than or equal to the exercise 
price).13 It is important for the reader to note that the 
recognition of option compensation as an expense in firms’ 
financial statements is a separate issue from whether option 
compensation is an economic cost. Institutional accounting 
rules are influenced by objectives to produce reliable financial 
statements, as well as by the political process. With respect to 
option compensation, these forces have resulted in financial 
accounting rules that allow most firms to avoid recognition of 
option expense in accounting earnings, and to disclose instead 
an estimate of the expense in a footnote to the financial 
statements.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2003 43
Although firms can choose to expense (that is, reduce 
reporting earnings) the estimated value of options granted, few 
firms make this choice. As such, other things being equal 
(including firms’ economic profits), the accounting earnings of 
firms that grant options extensively are expected to be greater 
than the earnings of firms that use no options. In contrast, 
stock appreciation rights, which provide an identical payoff to 
options but settle in cash rather than in stock, are required to 
be expensed. However, regardless of whether firms choose to 
expense options in income, pro-forma income that includes 
option expense must be disclosed in the footnotes to the 
financial statements. Furthermore, there is significant 
disclosure about outstanding employee options in both the 
firm’s proxy statement and annual report. Evidence in Aboody 
(1996) and Bell et al. (2001) is consistent with an efficient stock 
market recognizing and pricing these competing claims to the 
firm’s equity.
Nevertheless, firm managers appear to behave as if they 
believe their stock prices would suffer if earnings included an 
expense for stock option compensation. For example, Carter 
and Lynch (2001b) find that firms accelerated repricing activity 
around the effective date of an accounting rule that required 
expensing of repriced options. Prior to December 1998, 
repricings did not trigger an accounting expense. After this 
date, firms were required to use variable accounting for 
repriced options, thereby incurring an accounting expense. 
The authors find that firms accelerated repricing activity 
around the effective date of this accounting rule. Following this 
change in accounting treatment, Carter and Lynch (2001b) 
observe a sharp reduction in the use of repricings to reinstate 
incentives. A survey by iQuantic (2001) finds that the majority 
of high-tech “new-economy” firms with underwater options 
have switched from repricing underwater options to giving a 
supplemental grant of options at the lower strike price. If 
canceling and reissuing options was optimal from a contracting 
standpoint, it seems that firms are incurring real economic 
costs to avoid the accounting expense associated with repricings.
If managers incorrectly perceive that there are real costs 
associated with expensing compensation, options may be 
overused and substituted for other forms of compensation, 
such as cash or restricted stock. If there is a very large real cost 
of expensing options, firms might prefer options even if, as 
argued by Hall and Murphy (forthcoming), their economic 
cost is greater than that of restricted stock. It is important for 
future research to examine the role of accounting in motivating 
firms to either increase or decrease their use of stock options. 
Specifically, shareholders presumably want the board of 
directors to select stock option plans that maximize 
shareholder value, not short-term earnings. Thus, if indexed 
options or other stock option designs that require variable 
accounting provide optimal incentives for executives, why 
would a board reject such a compensation plan because of 
“unfavorable” accounting? Clearly, the role of financial 
accounting for employee stock options is of considerable 
importance to firms, but is not well understood by economists.
4.8 Do Executives and Lower Level 
Employees Actually Understand How 
Stock Options Work and the Implicit 
Incentives in These Options?
There is an extensive literature in the behavioral sciences 
regarding biases in individual beliefs, and a growing literature 
in finance and insurance on heuristic behavior by investors 
(for example, Odean [1998]). Benartzi (2001) shows that 
employees invest a large fraction of their 401(k) assets in their 
own firm’s stock, which seems to be a suboptimal portfolio 
choice given their large human capital investment in the firm. 
An assumption or implication of these studies is that some 
individuals do not understand the expected distribution of 
stock prices. Researchers are beginning to examine how these 
psychological biases relate to employee stock options (for 
example, Heath et al. [1999] and Core and Guay [2001a]). 
Lambert and Larcker (2001b) provide direct evidence on this 
issue in a recent survey. Specifically, middle-level managers 
assign a value to their stock options that exceeds the Black-
Scholes value by 50 to 200 percent. This result suggests that the 
holder’s beliefs about the stock price distribution are different 
from those of the market, which is consistent with either 
systematically favorable private information or biased beliefs 
on the part of the option holder. If a large number of option 
holders do not understand the underlying price distribution, it 
is conceivable that they may not understand the incentives 
provided by an option. Certainly, employees understand that 
the value of the option increases when the stock price increases, 
and that increases in stock price are more likely when the 
employee and all the firm’s employees work harder, smarter, 
and more efficiently. However, as mentioned above, it is 
reasonable to question how accurately the partial derivatives of 
the Black-Scholes model measure executive incentives 
produced by stock options. An interesting question for future 
research is to examine how executives actually value their stock 
options. It would be useful to uncover what differences, if any, 
there are between the perceived and economic value of stock 
options, whether these differences vary with the employee’s 
level in the organization, in wealth, in education, and other 
factors, and the implications of these differences for the 
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A related question is whether it is good policy for the firms to 
recognize these biases and to “take advantage” of the employees 
by “selling” them “overvalued” equity. An alternative hypothesis 
is that people will pay for the chance to become very wealthy, and 
placing a large bet on the success of their firm may be their 
optimal portfolio choice. It would be possible to model this with 
a utility “function” or correspondence that is convex between 
present wealth and wealth that is ten times greater, even though 
it is locally concave at each wealth level. Of course, employees 
can satisfy their demand for stock with open market purchases 
so that any overvaluation that manifested itself would have to 
occur because employees cannot buy in the market the 
equivalent of a long-maturity option on their own firm’s stock.
5. Concluding Remarks
There is a long history of academic research that examines the 
managerial incentives associated with stock options and equity 
ownership. The aggressive use of stock options and the large 
payouts from stock option grants in recent years have 
produced considerable debate in boardrooms and the financial 
press about the desirability of using equity compensation in 
executive compensation programs. In this survey, we provide a 
synthesis of the major research findings, as well as the 
fundamental controversies and unresolved issues about equity 
incentives. As is commonly the case in academic work, decades 
of research have perhaps produced more questions than 
answers.
One of the key results from our survey is that simple 
normative prescriptions, such as “repricings are an indication 
of poor governance” or “more equity ownership by executives 
is always better than less ownership,” are inappropriate. It is 
almost always necessary to understand the objectives of 
shareholders, the characteristics of managers, and other 
elements of the decision-making setting before drawing any 
conclusions about the desirability of observed equity-based 
incentive plans or the level of equity ownership by managers. 
Sweeping statements about governance and compensation, 
without a detailed contextual analysis, are almost always 
misleading. Moreover, unsupported conjectures by activist 
shareholders can impose substantial costs on firms by 
motivating boards of directors to adopt inappropriate equity 
compensation plans to placate this same group of 
shareholders.Endnotes
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1. For example, there are many interesting design characteristics 
associated with stock options that we do not consider in this review. 
One such characteristic is the reload feature of some stock options. 
Hemmer et al. (1998) provide a useful analysis of reloads.
2. This assumption likely does not hold for CEOs with large turnover 
probabilities. For example, a new CEO is more likely to be terminated 
(and lose the present value of his future compensation) following poor 
performance than a CEO who has established his or her ability to run 
the firm.
3. Our assumption that the majority of a CEO’s incentives are driven 
by variation in equity portfolio values does not imply that accounting 
or nonfinancial performance measures (such as innovation and 
customer loyalty) are not used in contracting with CEOs. We only 
assume that for the typical CEO, the use of these measures in his 
contract does not create large incentives that are distinct from 
incentives to increase the stock price.
4. Haubrich (1994, p. 258) notes: “Jensen and Murphy use their 
findings to challenge the principal agent paradigm. The pay-
performance sensitivity of .003 is a far cry from the 1.0 predicted by 
the risk-neutral version of principal agent theory.” For a small group 
of CEOs with extremely high fractional ownership, Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1988) conclude that ownership was “too high.”
5. While traditional agency theory (for example, Holmstrom and 
Milgrom [1987] and Aggarwal and Samwick [1999]) predicts a 
decreasing relation between risk and optimal incentives (that is, less 
equity for managers of high-tech firms than for managers of utilities), 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and subsequent researchers find greater 
equity ownership for firms with greater uncertainty. Core and Guay 
(forthcoming b) reconcile these competing findings and show an 
increasing relation between risk and incentives, as predicted by 
Prendergast (2000), Core and Qian (2001), and Raith (2001).
6. From the employee’s perspective, deferred compensation, such as 
restricted stock and options, always provides higher expected after-tax 
returns (before adjusting for risk) than a cash payment of equal value 
because taxes on the return are deferred (Smith and Watts 1982).
7. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that it is important to control 
for significant outside owners when examining the effect of inside 
ownership on performance. For a survey of the governance effects of 
outside blockholders, see Holderness (2003).
8. It is important to note that, under the assumption of market 
efficiency, this hypothesis does not imply that stock returns will be 
lower for firms that contract suboptimally. That is, if the market 
understands that a firm is contracting suboptimally with its executives, 
the value of the firm will be lower but stock returns will be normal.
9. By “no” stock, we mean no stock other than the small amount of 
stock the CEO owns by owning the market portfolio. If CEO stock 
ownership was primarily driven by private information, one would 
expect to observe that some CEOs hold large quantities of stock (those 
CEOs with positive information) while other CEOs hold no stock 
(those CEOs with negative information). Further, one would expect to 
observe large swings in ownership as private information is generated 
and disseminated. These features are not commonly observed, and 
laws against insider trading seem to preclude this behavior.
10. Another exception to this point is the case of a founding CEO. 
In this case, it may be difficult for the CEO to sell all of her stock 
immediately without incurring substantial “signaling costs.” 
However, programs such as those employed by Bill Gates, in which the 
CEO announces regular sales at certain times in the future, allow 
founding CEOs to reduce their equity holdings gradually without 
incurring information costs.
11. It is possible that the executive is required to purchase firm stock 
in excess of his market portfolio holdings. In these cases (and 
assuming that shorting the market portfolio is costly or not feasible), 
the role of firm-sponsored RPE is likely to be greater.
12. Although the degree of executive diversification is generally 
unknown, some survey data are available. Lambert and Larcker 
(2001a) find that the average survey respondent has approximately
19 percent of her wealth directly tied to her firm. A survey conducted 
by Oppenheimer Funds Inc. (2000) finds that 32 percent of option 
holders had 20 percent or more of their financial assets in stock 
options or stock of their company, 20 percent had 30 percent or more, 
and 12 percent had 40 percent or more.
13. The fact that options may provide employees with incentives does 
not provide a justification for excluding an estimate of the economic 
cost of granting options from the computation of labor expense. To 
the extent that options create incentives, they are like any other 
incentive in that they work by imposing risk on the employee, and the 
firm has to pay the employee extra compensation to accept this risk. 
Evidence in Bell et al. (2001) is consistent with investors’ perception 
that services rendered by employees in return for newly granted 
options extend beyond the year in which the options are granted. As 
such, it may be reasonable to view the services received from option 
compensation as a temporary economic asset to be amortized 
(expensed) over a few years following the grant date.References
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